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ELECTRONIC INTEGRATION AND STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE:
A QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL STUDY IN THE
INSURANCE INDUSTRY
N. Venkatraman
Akbar Zaheer

Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

ABSTRACT
Strategic advantage through information technology is a popular theme, but the extent of research
support is sporadic, minimal, and unsystematic. This paper reports some preliminary results of a quasiexperimental study on the role of dedicated electronic integration (between an insurance carrier and its
independent agents in the Property and Casualty market) in providing strategic benefits to this carrier.

The results indicate that the agents that are electronically interfaced with the carrier report
improvements in a set of four performance factors in the expected direction (six months after system
installation) but statistically different from a matched set of non-interfaced agents (based on size, state,
and location category) only in terms of increases in efficiency (number of policies) but not in terms of
effectiveness (increase in financial performance indices). Further, within the sample of electronicallyinterfaced agents, over a one-year period after integration, the differential performance positions
continue for this factor, raising the possibility of learning effects. Some explanations, extensions and

research implications are outlined.
1.

INTRODUCTION

changing market characteristics (Bakos 1987; Malone,
Yates and Benjamin 1987). There is a glaring lack of
empirical research studies that particularly isolate the

The subject of information technology and its potential for

strategic advantage has gained currency in recent years.

effects, if any, of such systems on business performance.
Indeed, much of the support is based on anecdotes,

The evolving literature is largely dominated by conceptual
frameworks (McFarlan 1984; Porter and Millar 1985;

personal opinions and experiences rather than systematic

Wiseman 1985) and detailed case studies on popular
examples and applications such as McKesson's Economost

research studies. Thus, a formal, empirical assessment of
the role and benefits of electronic integration appears

system (Clemons and Row 1988), American Airlines'

necessary and timely.

SABRE reservation systems (Copeland and McKenney
1988) or American Hospital Supply's ASAP system
(Harvard Business School Case 1985, 1988). A major
reason for the consideration of IT-based applications as

Towards this end, this paper discusses the results of a
quasi-experimental study on the effects of electronic
integration in the insurance industry, with a particular

potential sources of strategic advantage lies in the capabili-

focus on the Property and Casualty (P&C) business. The
uniqueness of this study lies in

ty for electronic integration among a set of firms that
could potentially change the basis of competition in an
industry (Barrett and Konsynski 1982; Cash and Konsynski

(a) its quasi-experimental design with an alien'mental
sample of independent insurance agents that are
electronically interfaced (with a dedicated system) and
a matcheg control sample (based on size, state,

1984; Johnston and Vitale 1988). The term "electronic

integration: as used here involves the creation of a
business network among selected firms that centrally
exploit the capabilities offered by interorganizational

location category) of agents that are not electronically

interfaced with this particular insurance carrier; and

(information) systems (IOS).
While the role and benefits of interorganizational systems

(b) the use of objective, longitudinal performance data on

have achieved the status of conventional wisdom, the extent

these agents from the carrier's records that enables
one to isolate the specific effects of electronic integra-

of research support for arguing their importance is rather

limited. The current literature is restricted to discussions
of the nature and levels of IOS (Barrett and Konsynski
1982), descnptive and nonizative frameworks for managers to assess the role of IOS in their organizational
contexts (Cash and Konsynski 1984; Johnston and Vitale
1988) and theoretical discussions of the role of IOS in

tion.

Thus, the study offers an opportunity to systematically test

an implicitly-accepted, but largely-untested proposition on
the benefits of electronic integration. The paper is divided
into four sections. The next section discusses the theoreti-
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cal background for the study, and the particular character-

booked through the SABRE system was much higher for
American Airlines' flights than for any other airline whose
schedules were also displayed on the system.

istics of the P&C market, leading to the formulation of the

research hypothesis. The third section discusses the
research design, data and analysis. The fourth section

While there appears to be strong face validity to the results
reported in these case studies, from a research point of
view they need to be supplemented using more formal
criteria of social science research. For this purpose, we
use the following set of six criteria provided by Terpstra
(1981) in his assessment of research studies on organization development effects: the presence of a probability

presents the results and discusses the implications.

2.

BACKGROUND: THEORETICAL CONCEPTS
AND RESEARCH SETTING

2.1 Electronic Integration and Strategic Advantage

sample, an adequate sample size for analysis, the use of a

In this research stream, terms like IOS, EDI (electronic

control group, random selection for treatment, pre- and

data interchange), and VAP (value-added partnerships)
have often been used synonymously. Our view of "elec-

post-tests, and the use of significance levels for assessing

the effects of treatment. For a systematic evaluation of
electronic integration effects, these criteria need to be
satisfied.

tronic integration" involves (a) arrangements and transactions in a business network that is fundamentally enabled

by electronic interfacing, i.e., multi-organization information systems, and (b) firms in the business network that are
Iligh

independent along some dimensions (i.e., they are not
entirely dependent) such that it is distinguished from
vertical, quasi-integration (Blois 1972). In other words,
electronic integration refers to strategies adopted by the
different firms in a business network Uarillo 1988) that is
centrally defined using one or more electronic interfaces.
Thus, this conceptualization builds on the deployment of
IOS but has a distinct business orientation; similarly,
electronic integration goes beyond the adoption of EDI
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The American Hospital Supply Corporation's (AHSC, now
Baxter Travenol) ASAP System is a classic, overworked
illustration in this area. Although no systematic assessment
of its effects is available, by 1984 over 4,500 customers
were linked through this system which carried over 100,000
products. Further, AHSC increased its sales by an average
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of thirteen percent per year during the period 1978 to 1983.
A typical hospital order through this system averaged 5.8

(3) nis study

(4) Business Week, Fortune. MIS Week. etc.

items as compared to an industry average of 1.7 items
(Business Week 1980). Baxter executives and industry

Figure 1. Strategic Effects of Electronic Integration
An Assessment of Research Efforts (based on Bonoma [1985])

observers credit the system for the success of the company

in the competitive hospital supplies marketplace.

Nl ,

Fickl Saudies (2)

In

contrast, Clemons and Row (1988) provide a more detailed
analysis of McKesson's Economost system. According to

Further following Bonoma (1985) we position the literature on 2he effects of electronic integration in terms of two
dimensions:
cuirency (external validity) and data
integnky (reliability) in Figure 1. A major observation
from Figure 1 is that much of the available evidence is
based on anecdotes (discussions in the popular business

them, since the system was first introduced nationally in
1975, McKesson's drug sales have grown from $922 million

to $4.8 billion, an increase of 422 percent, while its
operating expenses have only gone up by 86 percent;
McKesson also sizably reduced the number of personnel

press), personal opinions, and a few selected detailed case-

in order entry and sales. Similarly, airlines reservation
systems have been studied in detail (e.g., Copeland and
McKenney 1988). Although exact data are not available,
it is widely acknowledged that the proportion of tickets

studies. This preponderance of case studies is not only
inevitable in the initial stages of a particular research
stream, but is also necessary for framing the critical
research questions. However, as the stream matures, it is
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necessary to go beyond these designs for formalized,
deductive assessments of propositions on the role and
benefits of electronic integration. Specifically, field
experiments and field studies (Figure 1) seem worthwhile
and attractive now.

systems, and exclusive agencies.

Third, there is an in-

creasing incidence of the installation of agency automation
systems ("back-office" automation), which require larger
business volumes with the resulting scale economies to be
efficient. Finally, electronic integration between insurance
carriers and independent agents is another force that has

been changing the competitive characteristics of the

This study is explicitly predicated on the need to design
and conduct a field experiment on the effects of electronic

marketplace. A recent survey estimated that 28 percent of

integration and incorporates five of the six criteria of
Terpstra (1981) into its design.

all independent agents were integrated with at least one
insurance carrier (d'Adolf 1987, p. 28).
Within the P&C market, personal lines are characterized

2.2 The Property and Casualty Insurance Market

by increasing vertical integration because of their relatively
standardized and regulated products. Insurance products

The US insurance industry divides broadly into the Life

of personal lines have been prime targets of large insur
ance carriers for obtaining efficiencies from high volume

and Health and the Property and Casualty (P&C) markets,

processing as evidenced by a high degree of computeriza-

each with its distinctive set of products and channels of
distribution. P&C insurance offers protection against such
risks as fire, theft, accident and general liability. The P&C
market further breaks out into personal and commercial
lines, the former covering individuals (automobile and
homeowner insurance for example) and the latter indemnifying business policy holders against general liability and
workers' compensation. The industrygenerated about $200
billion in premiums in 1988 (based on Standard and Poor
industry surveys).

tion in their operations. In contrast, commercial lines are
less regulated, more complex, and thus are being automated in terms of computerized policy processing only
recently. It is not coincidental that expert systems, which
have seen a surge of development of late, are beginning to
have an integral role in the automation of commercial
lines. This study focuses on the specific effects of automation of the commercial lines.

The P&C insurance market, particularly its commercial

2.3 The Nature of Electronic Integration

lines, relies mainly on independent agents for distribution
of its products to the customer, unlike the Life and Health

Industry standards for electronic policy information

Companies which typically employ large sales forces.

transfer between the carrier and insurance agents have
been set by the industry organization, ACORD. In 1983,

Independent agents are compensated on commission terms

and they retain the rights to their policies and accounts,
even if their relationship with the insurance carrier issuing
the policy is terminated. Thus, the independent agent is
entitled to continue receiving commissions on unexpired
policies, although the agent may sell the renewal rights on
the policy (Stern and El-Ansary 1977).

the Insurance Value Added Networks (IVANS) was
established. While the agents seem favorably disposed to

the use of a common standard, some carriers are less
enthusiastic about adopting a common standard as they

believe that a "true interface" between the agent and all the
relevant carriers would make the market more pricecompetitive than before. This is because the transaction

cost of accessing and evaluating alternate quotes is drama-

The P&C market is composed of over 3,600 insurance
carriers since there are few barriers to entry. This level of

tically reduced, thereby improving the market positions of

fragmentation makes for highly competitive conditions and
intense price-based competition. Approximately 300
carriers have multiple offices (Frost and Sullivan 1984) and
20 to 30 are major carriers accounting for about 50 percent
of revenues. The largest carrier accounted for about nine

the agents relative to the carriers.

percent in 1986 and the top four controlled only 21
percent, indicating relatively low market power in the
industry.

the delivery of the insurance product.

Indeed, in in the

terminology of Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987), such
a move would have propelled the industry from a decentralized marketplace towards an electronic market due to

significant reductions in the "unit costs of coordination" of
To counter the move towards common, industry-wide
standards, some leading insurance carriers (such as Aetna,
CIGNA, Travellers, St. Paul) have chosen to install
systems with proprietary interface standards operated

Further, we are seeing a major transformation of the
industry in recent years along several dimensions. One,
there has been a reduction in the number of independent

through private networks. This initiative stalls (albeit in a
limited way) the movement towards predominantly price-

agents by as much as 25 percent during the period 1980 to
1986 (d'Adolf 1987, p. 27.) to around 42,000 due to the
consolidation of agency operations. Two, there is a
growing trend in forward integration by carriers through
mechanismssuchasdirect-writing, commissionedemployee

based competition, which might result from agents using
a common network to "instantaneously shop around" for

the best price (as enabled, for example, by the airline
reservation system).
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This research is focused exclusively at the level of one

2.4 The Expected Benefits of Electronic Integration

carrier that has installed such a system with its agents (who
may or may not be electronically interfaced with other

The Underlying Theory. Following Malone, Yates and

carriers).

Benjamin(1987),developments ininformationtechnologics

Electronic Integration and the Carrier's Business Strategy. Electronic integration with the agents is considered

by this carrier to be a central element in its business
strategy. The carrier's business strategy in the P&C
market can be broadly described in terms of (a) reducing
the number of agents to concentrate on a limited number

of high-potential agents (with significant share-of-business
with this carrier); (b) controlling loss ratios (which are
highly related to the share-of-business of the agent, i.e., the

largest share carrier has the best loss-ratios); and (c)
creating product differentiation (through higher service
levels).
This business strategy is supported by electronic integration
by way of the installation of a commercial policy processing
system at selected independent agents. The specific

are expected to give rise to three sets of effects: (a)
electronic communication 4ect, reducing costs of
communication while expanding the reach (time and
distance); (b) e/ectronic brokerage e#ect, increasing the
number and quality of considerations of alternatives, and
decreasing the cost of transactions; and (c) electronic
integration efects, increasing the degree of interdependence between the set of participants involved in the
insurance delivery process. Had the insurance industry
adopted a common platform for integration (as in the
current state of airlines reservation systems), it would have
presumably resulted in all three effects being operative
leading to an electronic marketplace. However, such is not
the case here. This situation is one of a small group of
carriers -- mainly the larger ones -- each with its own
network of agents (with the larger agents having multiple
interfacing capabilities) expecting to realize benefits from

dedicated vertical information systems.

characteristics of the system are:

An additional argument is provided by Rotemberg and
Saloner (1989) in their discussion of cooperative advantage

(a) On-litte policy quotation, which enables the agent to
obtain relevant information on a potential quote with
relative ease and quickness compared to the traditional
means of paper-based communication with the carrier

versus competitive advantage through information techno-

logy networks. The former arises when a firm goes along
with a common standard instead of pushing its own
proprietary standard. However, if a firm can successfully
differentiate its network, then the competitive advantage
gained from such a network may be greater than the

(typically between one and two weeks). More importantly, the ease of information exchange implies that
this carrier would at least be under active consideration for channeling the business.

cooperative advantage of standardization. Thus, this is a
central business strategy decision for the insurance carrier
and, in the present setting, the carrier has decided to go

(b) Multiple option flexibili(y,
which enables the agent
to explore alternative bundles of specifications at the

with a dedicated system.

decentralized location on-line.
Thus, following Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987),
Rotemberg and Saloner (1989), and Williamson (1975), our
theory would predict that each carrier that deploys a
network characterized by limited access (with the associated benefits of electronic communication and integration
for the connected agents) would benefit significantly in

(c) Risk evaluation, which provides an efficient basis for
evaluating the risk propensity of a prospective policy

with the capability offered by the back-end expert
systems.
(el) Policy issuance, which allows agents to initiate the
process of issuing a policy at remote carrier locations,

terms of greater business volume and increased market
share. This is because the classical forces favoring commo-

thereby increasing agents' control and reducing paper-

ditization of the insurance product (in the electronic

handling.
(e) Endorsements,

markets) are countered by IT-enabled differentiation
mechanisms operating within electronic hierarchies. The
which allow greater autonomy and

specific characteristic of electronic hierarchies here is
provided bythe existence of linked databases and processes

responsibility for post-issuance support (including
minor modifications).

(underwriting and the role of expert systems) between the
agents and the carriers.

(f) Chu'ins handling, which automates the steps involved
in settling claims, resulting in improved efficiency and
greater level of service.

nvo Levels of Analysis. In the case of electronic integration involving two distinct types of organizations, namely
the carrier (i.e., the deployer of the system) and the agent
(i.e., where the system is deployed), it is important to
differentiate the type and extent of strategic advantages to

An additional feature of this specific deployment is that the
system is installed at no cost to the agents as the carrier

bears the entire expense of hardware, software, communications and associated training.

the two organizations.
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At the level of the agent, the

(a) Cost Versus Benejit Approach, requiring a direct
economic assessment of all costs associated with this

specific benefits are as outlined above. Specifically, given
that the agent is not required to share the system costs, the

initiative compared directly against actual realized
benefits along a set of pre-specified performance
criteria.

benefits are directly provided by any increases in efficiency
and an improved capability to service existing and potential
clients. These issues, including the costs to the system and

captivity impacts, are beyond the scope of the current

(b) Benchmarking Approach, requiring an assessment
of performance improvements for the interfaced agents

paper, which specifically focuses on the benefits accrued to
the carrier.

against a matched sample of agents that are not
interfaced.

For the carrier, who deployed the dedicated system and
bore its costs and given the relative increase in the "ease
of doing business," the expectation is that more business
would be channelized to this carrier than before. Specifically, if we argue that commercial insurance products are

The cost-benefit
reasons.

becoming commodities with strong price-competition and
fewer opportunities for true product differentiation, it
appears that "information" (enhanced through specific
electronic interfacing) is a major dimension of differentia-

a.

approach is complex for the following

The costs were incurred over a period of several years
over successive iterations of the system rendering a

direct cost versus benefit comparison somewhat
difficult.

tion. Information-based differentiation is important for the
personal lines products because they are largely informa-

b.

tion-intensive, but commercial lines products have an
additional dimension of differentiability since they are
more knowledge-intensive.

Given the carrier's strategy of adopting a proprietary
system to create sources of firm-specific competitive

advantage, some of the benefits are not directly
measurable in terms of short-term improvements in
performance.

There are interesting parallels with other cases. For
example, the ASAP system has reportedly channelized

c.

The system is conceived by the firm as a strategic
thrust involving several business lines over many years,
thus making any precise cost allocation for a given set
of business nearly impossible.

more business to American Hospital Supply due to ease of
system use as well as its capability to assist in a variety of
business transactions such as order-status, tracking, and so

on. Similarly, as American Airlines received a greater
proportion of business based on the "display bias" on the
screen, the expectation is that the focal, interfaced carrier
would always be considered as a potential underwriter of
a particular business (as long as it offers the product line).

d,

A direct cost versus benefit assessment does not rule
out the possibility that agents could substitute other
business factors, for example better service and lower
prices, to compensate for the lack of system functionalitics such as instant information on policies.

Further, there is the expectation of increased business
volume from the agents resulting from an expansion of
their volume of operations. The efficiencies in information

In cont4ast, the benchmarking

benefits.

approach has the following

processing through electronic integration would ensure that
a.

It controls for the temporal context of industry cycles
given that both sets of agents are facing the same
external conditions.

tiators of the commercial insurance product. Thus, the
agent's capability -- to quote, issue, and underwrite policies
specifically tailored to the customer requirements and
differentially from the competitors who are not electronically interfaced -- is considerably enhanced.

b.

It isolates the specific IT-based gains by using a
matched sample.

c,

It avoids arbitrariness in cost allocation and focuses on
effects relative to a benchmarked sample.

Assessment of Effects of Electronic Integration. As noted

Therefore, the effects are assessed from a goal-centered
perspective (Cameron and Whetten 1983) in terms of the
specific set of benefits expected by the focal carrier. This

the agent could service a larger account base than before.

The assumption here is that the differential information
processing capabilities (such as timeliness, accuracy,
efficiency, and expert-system support) are critical differen-

before, this paper is focused at the level of the insurance
carrier. The approaches to assessment of effectiveness is
a thorny issue in organizational research (Cameron and

set of expected benefits was created based on discussions
with the company executives and it includes increases in
total written premium, number of policies in force, com-

Whetten 1983), including IS research, which uses several
different constructs (e.g., Trice and Treacy 1989). There
are two dominant approaches to the assessment of expected benefits for the carrier.

missions, and new business policies. Collectively, these
represent the effectiveness construct for this study.
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2.5 Hypothesis

however, we were fortunate to obtain a reasonable,
matched control group. This design controls for a major

The general hypothesis for the study is stated in a null

set of threats to validity.

form (with an alternate form).
Ho: Electronic integration will have no effect on the
performance of the interfaced agents as compared with

6 Months
Before

the non-interfaced agents;

Halt:Electronic integration will have a positive effect on
the performance of the agents that are electronically
interfaced as compared to those that are not interfaced.

3.

RESEARCH DESIGN

INTERFACED
AGENTS

11

NON·INTERFACED

*2

Electronic
Integration

6 Months

After

X

AGENIS

Il

K

X - Electronic Integration("treatment")

3.1 Design of Quasi-Experiment

Ki - Perfolmance Assessment al 4 · 1-1,4

As mentioned above, the research design involved a quasi-

Halt

i

experimental study of the performance effects of electronic

integration in the commercial lines of the P&C market
with a particular focus on the electronic integration by one
major carrier. The essential characteristics of the design

113 --Ll

>
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:

It3 -=-1Lt
Kl

ir,4 - 1[.

K2
=

ZA_ - le
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involved five steps.

Figure 1 The Design of the Quasi-Experimental Study

I.

Identification of a random sample of agents that

are electronically-interfaced with the carrier
(termed here as the "experimental" group).

II.

The integration with the agents began in 1985 and is still

continuing. For this research, in order to control for
possible temporal effects (particularly sensitive in the

Identification of a "matched set" of non-interfaced
agents who are matched using three critical
criteria:

size (in terms of premium volume),

location category (metro, small city, suburban
versus rural), and geographic category (state or

III.

for statistical analysis, we chose the year that recorded the

largest integrations, which was 1987. The sample size for

the same location category was selected.

the same size category, in the same state, and in

the two groups are interfaced group (i.e., treatment),
n = 85, and non-interfaced, n = 75.

Identification of the date of electronic integration.
This was the later of the two dates on which the

3.2 Data

were electronically interfaced, as identified by the
carrier for each agent.

Data on the four performance indicators were obtained
from the internal records of the insurance carrier. For
each agent, the performance levels were obtained for six
months prior to integration and for six months after the
integration. Given that all the data are obtained from the

Selection of a "performance effects window" six
months prior to interfacing and six monthst after

interfacing.
V.

the sample was restricted to those integrated in one
calendar year. Given our need for an adequate sample size

region). In other words, a corresponding agent in

two most significant commercial lines of business

IV.

insurance industry which is susceptible to volatile cycles),

internal records, there are no compelling reasons to expect
differential measurement systems fur the two groups (one

Analysis of the performance effects of integration.

of the common threats to validity in this type of design).
The measurement error, if any, is common to the two
groups of agents.

The quasi-experimental design adopted for the research

needs some discussion. As shown in Figure 2, the design
adopted is the untreated control gioup design with
pirtest and posttest (Cook and Campbell 1979). This is
different from the pure experimental design version in,·
which the experimental subjects are assigned randomly
from a common population. We did not have the opportunity to influence the selection of agents to be interfaced;

Performance attributable to integration is assessed as the

slope (in terms of differences) rather than as absolute
levels, This is because the inherent differences in the
performance levels before integration are corrected by
focusing on the changes in performance. Discussions with
the managers of the carrier indicated that no other major
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confounding factors exist differentially across the two
groups. Thus, if performance differences are found for the
electronically-interfaced group in comparison to the control
group, they can be attributed with confidence to electronic
integration.

The performance differences across the two groups are
assessed using t-tests. Since the data on percentage

changes in performance appeared not to conform to
standard normal distributions, data on percentage changes
in performance were rescaled using a natural log transformation. The values for skewness and kurtosis, which far
exceeded the normal range in the original scale,, now

exhibited values within an acceptable range for normal
distribution.
4.

Accordingly, we evaluated the performance changes
(percent) over a period of one year after integration.
There was a significant percentage increase in the number
of policies issued among the interfaced group compared
with the non-interfaced group (t-value: 2.04, p <.05). It is
important to recognize that while there is some possibility
of confounding effects due to a one-year window, these are
mitigated by the fact that the results are compared against

a benchmarked sample of matched agents in the same
time-period. So, in contrast to a posttest only design (even

with a matched sample), the confounding effects are
considerably minimized. However, along the dimensions
of total premium and commissions, there were no differences.

Thus, we speculate at this stage on the existence and
impact of learning effects in exploiting electronic integra-

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

tion opportunities and capabilities. This is because of the

Table 1 summarizes the results of the analysis. Three

effort required in shifting an organization deeply rooted in
one type of business process towards one that involves

important patterns emerge from this table. The interfaced
group had consistently better performance levels befoiv

radical shifts in the processes. Since we have not explored
nor measured this issue in any detail to conclude organiza-

integration (along all of the four criteria) than the noninterfaced group (all the t-values are significant at p <.01).

This is largely attributed to the fact that the carrier
obviously selected its better-performing agents for electro-

tional learning effects, we note it as an interesting and
important issue worthy of further research attention and

we are exploring longitudinal designs with complementary
primary data from the agents on their process changes.

nic integration and thus a true experimental design would
not have been possible. This further reinforces the need
to assess percentage changes in the two groups rather than

4.2 Synthesis

The interfaced group continued to report consistently
better performance levels after integration (along all of

The aim of this study was to assess the collective performance of a set of agents that are electronically interfaced
against a corresponding group that is not interfaced

absolute differences.

the four criteria) than the non-interfaced group (all the tvalues are significant at levels better than p <.01). Thus,

a posttest-only design would have been of limited value.

electronically with a focal carrier. The results provide
modest support for performance increase along some
dimensions (e.g., new business policies for the six-month
window), but the overall performance effects are not very

The third pattern, however, is particularly striking. The

strong. Further, while new policies are an important
element of the insurance business, it is equally important

group. Indeed, only two of the t-values are significant,

to focus on the quality of the insurance sold by these
agents. For this purpose, it is critical to also assess

differences
in performance levels are generally not
statistically different from the non-interfaced (control)
albeit marginally, at p <.10 and both relate to e#icieng,

performance of loss-ratios, especially in those cases where
electronic integration also involved the decentralization of

-- namely, increase in the number of policies. Both
measures of financial performance, written premium and

underwriting authority to the agents.

commissions, did not differ between the two groups.

This requires a

complementary, focused analysis at the level of the agent

(which is being carried out).

4.1 The Question or Learning Effects

43 Research Implications

At this stage, there exists an obvious question of learning
effects: Is it possible that the performance improvements

The major implication is that there is a critical need to
systematically study the theoretical propositions on the role

lion due to the internal process transformation that may be

and effects of electronic integration that have been recently
offered (Malone, Yates and Benjamin 1987; Rotemberg

were not observed within a six-month period after integra-

necessary to fully exploit the capabilities offered by
integration? Adequate prior support exists for arguing that
the effects of technology are not instantaneous and that
organizations need to transform their internal processes to
fully exploit IT capabilities (Rockart and Short 1989).

and Saloner 1989). Towards this end, this study has made

a modest attempt in designing and executing a field

experiment. We believe that this is valuable for addressing
the research questions in this area. However, researchers

should examine other designs (presented in Figure 1) to
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Table 1. Performance Effects of Electronic Integration
Monthly Averages ($000)

Cover six month period)

Performance
Indicator

,

Interface (n=85)
Mean Sd

Non-Interface (n=75)
Mean Sd

T-Test
Difference

Total Written Premium (Before)

166.5

255.2

74.5

59.8

3.25***

Total Written Premium (After)

201.2

411.8

70.2

68.4

2.99***

Change (%) in Total Premium 1

26.9

75.0

105.7

456.8

-1.34

Change (%) in Total Premium
(log transformed) 2

4.65

0.66

4.61

0.99

0.31

No. of Policies in Force (Before)

302.3

596.9

116.3

85.6

2.87***

No. of Policies in Force (After)

322.8

679.1

106.2

78.6

3.09***

14.7

40.1

6.2

34.1

1.46

(log transformed)

4.70

0.25

4.63

0.26

1.95**

Commisions (Before)

25.1

49.0

10.3

8.3

2.76***

Commisions (After)

30.4

74.9

9.4

9.2

2.65***

Change (%) in Commisions

25.6

73.9

88.8

397.2

-1.27

Change (%) in Commisions
(log transformed)

4.65

0.62

4.62

0.92

0.27

7.8

9.3

3.8

3.4

3.70***

2.8

2.0

4.12***

178.2

-0.45

0.85

1.63*

Change (%) in No. of Policies in Force
Change (%) in No. of Policies in Force

New Business Policies (Before)
New Business Policies (After)

9.1

14.2

Change (%) in New Business Policies

14.8

76.6

Change (%) in New Business Policies
(log transformed)

4.59

0.53

***pS .01

**pg .05

25.7

4.39

*PS .1

1

Change is calculated as (after-before)*100/before for each agent and then mean values
reported for the entire sample.

2

Due to high skewness in the distributions, log tranformations provide more appropriate
comparisons of percentage changes.
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complement the richness of in-depth case studies. Such
a move would ensure that our prescriptions for electronic

integration have not only theoretical validity but also

Bonoma, T. V. "Case Research in Marketing: Opportunities, Problems and a Process." Journal ofMarketing
Research, Number 22, 1985, pp. 199-208.

empirical support.

Blois, K. J.

"Vertical Quasi-Integration." Journal of

For this specific research, the implication is that this
broad-brush design should be complemented by a study

Industnal Economics, Number 20, 1972, pp. 253-272.

that focuses at the level of the interfaced agent. Such a
study would shed light on the determinants of variance in
performance within this set of agents, given that electronic

Business Week. "Information Processing." September 8,
1980, p. 73.

integration alone does not determine agents' performance.
The role of organizationaltransformation in fullyexploiting

Business Week. "Information Business." August 25, 1986,
pp. 82-90.

the benefits of electronic integration should also be
considered .

Business Week. "Information Power." October 14,1985.

Finally, it is fashionable to call for longitudinal designs in
virtually any stream of research, but this study provided
some support for its use in this area. The possibility of
learning and the larger question of sustainability of benefits

Cameron, K., and Whetten, D. "Organizational Effectiveness: One Model or Several?" In K. S. Cameron and D.

A. Whetten, Editors, O,ganizational EUectiveness: A
New York:

underscores the usefulness of longitudinal designs.

Comparison of Multiple Perspectives.
Academic Press, 1983, pp. 1-24.

5.

Cash, J. I., and Konsynski, B. "IS Redraws Competitive
Boundaries." Han'ard Business Review, Volume 63,

CONCLUSIONS

Number 2, 1985, pp. 134-142.

This study focused on the effects of electronic integration

(through proprietary standards) of one major carrier with
a set of independent agents. The effects of electronic
integration were assessed from the perspective of the focal

Clemons, E. K., and Row, M. "McKesson Drug Company:
A Case Study of Economost -- A Strategic Information
System: Journal of Management Information Systems,
Summer 1988, Volume 5, Number 1.

carrier in terms of the degree ofincteases in pe,fonnance
reported by a sample of interfaced agents as compared to

a matched set of non-interfaced agents.

The results

Cook, T. D., and Campbell, D. T. Quasi-Experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings,

(especially the non-parametric test results) indicate modest

Houghton Mifflin, 1979.

support for the hypothesis of performance effects due to
integration. In addition, there seems to be an interesting

"learning" effect, since agents interfaced for a year show

Copeland, D. G., and McKenney, J. L. "Airline Reserva-

tion Systems:

significant increases in performance over corresponding
agents not interfaced with difference absent at the six-

Lessons from History." MIS Quarterly,

September 1988, pp. 353-370.

month mark.
d'Adolf, S. V. "Its a Smaller Agency World." I,idependent
Agent, August 1987.
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ENDNOTES

1.

Discussions with the managers and agents indicates

Rotemberg, J., and Saloner, G. 'Information Technology
and Strategic Advantage." Unpublished Manuscript,

that this is an appropriate window.

There is an

Management in the 199()s Research Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989.

effects may not be observed, while if the window is too
large, the impact of other confounding effects can not

obvious trade-off. If the "window" is too small, the
be ruled out within this design.

Standard and Poor. Industo, Surveys: Insurance and
Investment Banking, December 31, 1987.

2.

The sample sizes for the two groups are not exactly
the same due to missing values for some of the performance measures but, on average, the sample size is

Stern, L. W., and El-Ansary, A. I. Ma,keting Channels,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977.

around 80 for each.
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